We examine the e¤ect of competition on investment decisions in an industry in which each …rm has a completely irreversible investment opportunity and the product market has positive externalities for a small market size and negative externalities for a large market size. In the latter case, which corresponds to the traditional competitive industries, …rms invest sequentially as market pro…tability develops. In the former case, which corresponds to industries in which investment is mutually bene…cial, …rms invest simultaneously after the market's pro…tability has developed su¢ ciently to gain all network bene…ts and to recover the option value of waiting. These extensions of a "real options" analysis may help explain rapid and sudden developments such as recent Internet investment, or explain the late take-o¤ phenomenon of prolonged start-up problems, such as the case of fax machine production.
Introduction
decreases as more consumers buy the good. This occurs because of congestion, as the communication and information-based industries are recently experiencing. Even though the introduction of a new Web site increases the value of the Internet to every existing user, the progressive increase of its use increases congestion measured in term of excessive delay of transmission (longer connection time spent to load a Web page) or loss of service altogether (Odlyzko, 1999) . Congestion then reduces consumers' utility of joining the Internet and passes this disadvantage to the …rms by reducing the demand of access. 3 The negative externalities case corresponds to the traditional competitive industry in which the investment of one …rm lowers the pro…tability of the others. In this case the introduction of competition has two opposing e¤ects which o¤set each other. Firstly, competition reduces the expected pro…t ‡ow that derives from the investment, which tends to delay investment. Secondly, competition introduces a strategic bene…t in favour of the investment as it deters the investments by rivals. Leahy (1993) …rst discovered this property, showing that the optimal investment strategy of a competitive …rm is equal to that of a single …rm in isolation. In this case, …rms enter sequentially as market pro…tability increases.
On the contrary, when investments are mutually bene…cial, the optimal investment policy is essentially a question of coordination. As the timing of a …rm's entry is in ‡uenced by the entry decisions of others, Leahy's result cannot be applied. Two equilibria can emerge: either the industry remains locked-in with no entry as long as very pessimistic expectations dominate the market, or a mass of …rms simultaneously runs to enter, driven by the expected rents generated by the positive externalities. 4 Excluding the former, we show that this "network run" is triggered when the pro…tability of the market has developed su¢ ciently to allow the …rms to capture all bandwagon bene…ts and to recover the option value of waiting due to the irreversibility. This also determines endogenously the optimal start-up size of the industry. Therefore, our model is an extension of the dynamic equilibrium in a competitive industry presented by Leahy (1993) and Dixit (1994, ch.5). 5 Furthermore, Nielsen (2002) , focusing on a duopoly model with positive externalities, predicts a similar result to ours, namely that …rms invest simultaneously at the market pro…tability given by the duopoly solution. 6 More generally, this result holds in a free entry framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the basic assumptions behind the model. Section 3 gives the main results of the paper, namely the optimal entry strategy in the presence of positive and negative externalities. Section 4 places the paper within the context of the literature on irreversible investment and market structure. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Model and assumptions
We have considered the decision to enter a new market subject to uncertain returns by a large number of identical …rms. In order to focus exclusively on the competitive timing process, we have abstained from explicitly describing either the product market decisions (price or quantity), or the …rm size, and we have assumed that entry costs required to initiate the technology projects are given. These conditions are summarized by the following assumptions: 7 1. At any time t an idle …rm may decide to enter a new market. Firms are risk-neutral and discount the future returns at the risk-less interest rate : 8 2. All …rms are identical. Their size dq is in…nitesimally small with respect to the market. 9 5 Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier (2002) extends Dixit and Pindyck's model considering Cournot-Nash competition. Their analysis indicates that although qualitatively the investment process is similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium, oligopoly quantitatively slows investment. 6 Huisman (2001, ch.8) extends the Nielsen (2002) model introducing asymmetry into the investment cost of …rms. Although cost asymmetry may reduce the positive externality e¤ect, both …rms invest simultaneously and early, anticipating that the other will also invest early. 7 These assumptions rule out market structure and monopoly power, which are beyond the scope of this paper. (see Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Amir and Lambson, 2003) . 8 Introducing risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be developed under a risk neutral probability measure (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979) . 9 Many in…nte time models of industry investment evolution show this assumption (see Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Lambson, 1992; Bartolini, 1993 3. Each …rm can enter by committing forever to a ‡ow cost w or undertaking a single irreversible investment which requires an initial sunk cost K w= .
4. Once the investment is undertaken, it cannot be abandoned. 10 5. Firms are free to enter. That is, …rst they decide whether or not to enter (and pay the entry cost K) and then compete for the available rents (generated by positive externalities).
6. After entry, …rms sell a continuos ‡ow of one unit of output. Thus, q indicates the number of …rms currently active (incumbents) as well as the total demand. 11 7. Each …rm produces a ‡ow of operating pro…ts that we have abbreviated as:
where t is a multiplicative industry-speci…c shock at time t. 12 We may consider, in a simpler setting, D(q t ) as the inverse demand function (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 9; Bartolini, 1993; Nielsen, 2002) , or as a reduced form of a more general pro…t function (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 11; Dixit, 1995; Grenadier, 2002) . Time is continuous, t 2 [0; 1); and suppressed if not necessary.
8. The function D(q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in q, and it is increasing over the interval [0; q) and decreasing thereafter (see …gure 1). That is, there are positive externalities to investment which can be caused by "network externalities" or by complementary products, over [0; q). After q it is better that no other has invested for any individual …rm, given that competition and/or congestion may occur (Shy, 2001 , ch. 5). We also assume that at zero and at some …nite 1 0 Besides irreversibility, this assumption avoids the need to consider such operating options such as reducing output or even shutting down, thereby considering reducing variable costs. For further details see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 1 1 None of the following results depend on this assumption (Grenadier, 2002) . 1 2 This assumption highly simpli…es the analysis of the industry equilibrium without reducing the impact of the results obtained. By considering only industry-wide uncertainty, a …rm knows that if rises entry becomes, ceteris paribus, as attractive for the other …rms as for itself. Then the entry of new …rms may overaccelerate investment if the industry has positive externalities or it may dampening pro…ts if negative externalities are at work. See Jovanovic, (1982), Hopenhayn, (1992) and Miao (2005) for models of industry equilibrium with only …rm-speci…c shocks, and Caballero and Pindyck (1992) for a more general model where both uncertainties coexist. number of …rms Q (Q >> q); pro…ts falls to zero, i.e. D(0) = 0; and D(Q) = 0; whatever the value of : As Q could be arbitrarily large, this assumption is harmless in our setting. 
Applying Itô's Lemma to (1) and substituting (2) to eliminate d ; an expression for the pro…t process in terms of the shock and the number of …rms emerges as:
where (q) D 0 (q)=D(q) indicates the direct e¤ect of entry. From (3), entry in ‡uences the level of pro…ts through its e¤ect on the market equilibrium, depending on the initial size of the industry. In particular, given any value of the shock ; more …rms in the market implies a higher or lower equilibrium level of pro…ts depending on the presence of positive (q) > 0 or negative (q) < 0 externalities, respectively.
The main results
This section summarizes the main properties of the entry process, emphasizing the economic reasoning behind it. All proofs are in the Appendix. 13 
Negative externalities
If the initial size of the industry is; we expect entry to work as follows: for a …xed number of …rms, pro…ts move according to the above stochastic process with (q) dq = 0. If pro…ts then climb to a level D(q) ; entry will become feasible and pro…ts will drop along the function D(q): In technical terms this means that the threshold becomes an upper re ‡ecting barrier on the pro…t process. 14 Pro…ts will then continue to move stochastically without the term (q) dq until another entry episode occurs. In addition, since the industry-wide shock makes all …rms symmetric, some random mechanism must be used to select which idle …rm will enter …rst.
A competitive equilibrium can be de…ned as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies which bound the pro…t process of the …rms. It can be built simply from the entry policy of a single …rm in isolation regardless of future entry decisions. 15 This remarkable property, …rst discovered by Leahy (1993) , has an important operative implication: the optimal competitive equilibrium policy need not take account of the entry e¤ect. The pro…t level, say^ ; that triggers entry by an individual …rm in isolation is identical to that of a …rm that correctly anticipates the other …rms' strategies . That is, when a …rm decides to enter it can claim to be the last to enter the industry, ignoring future entry by other …rms. This behavior can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1
The candidate policy for optimal entry in a competitive industry, characterized by an initial mass of …rms q 2 [ q; Q] is described by the following upper pro…t threshold:
where > and > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
Proof. See Leahy (1993) and Appendix With q incumbents, an idle additional …rm will invest if the present value of its pro…ts at entry, D(q) (q) ; exceeds the cost of the investment K augmented by the option to wait 1 1 K. 16 Over the range [ q; Q]; additional entry occurs every time pro…ts reach to the known threshold ; if pro…ts stay below this barrier, no new investment is undertaken.
Although at …rst glance this result seems surprising, it is consistent with the properties of the dynamic programming principle of optimality for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. The principle of optimality states that, given the initial conditions and control values, an optimal path has the property that the control over the remaining period must be optimal for the remaining problem, with the state due to the early decisions considered in the initial condition. This principle matches with the de…ni-tion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where a strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium if no …rm has the incentive to deviate from its strategy given that other …rms do not deviate (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 108) .
We can understand the competitive equilibrium better by writing this threshold in terms of the shock, : Since D(q) (q) and D(q) is decreasing in the region [ q; Q]; the optimal policy can be restated by the following upward-sloping curve ( Figure 2 ):
In the area above the curve, it is optimal to enter. A discrete mass of …rms will enter in a lump to move the pro…t level immediately to the threshold curve. In the region below the curve the optimal policy is inaction; …rms wait until the stochastic process moves it vertically to (q) and then again a mass of …rms will jump into the market, just enough to keep the pro…ts from crossing the threshold.
Positive externalities
Working backward, if the initial size q is less than q; any potential entrant is subject to positive externalities, so that the timing of a …rm's entry is in ‡uenced by the entry decisions of others. Intuition suggests that Leahy's result cannot be extended to cover this case; a single …rm cannot continue to claim to be the last to enter the industry in constructing its optimal entry policy. The gist of our argument relies on the presence of "network bene…ts"; so the more …rms in the industry, the greater the advantage in terms of pro…t ‡ow. However, although investing is pro…table, it is "more expensive" to do it alone than to enter with others or to follow others'decisions. This mean that the Nash equilibrium is represented by the myopic trigger^ and the sequential investment dynamics are no longer subgame-perfect. By the disadvantage of moving …rst and the strategic nature of the timing decision, each …rm can do better by delaying entry. 17 However, as all …rms are subject to the same (industry-wide) uncertainty shock, only two equilibrium patterns are possible: either the industry remains locked-in at the initial size, sustained by self-ful…lling pessimistic expectations, or a mass of …rms simultaneously enter, driven by the expected rents. 18 In the latter case, we expect entry to work as follows: for a …xed number of …rms, pro…ts move according to (3) with (q) dq = 0. If pro…ts reach to D(q) ; it will trigger an entry of more …rms that increases the industry's size instantaneously by a jump. The exact shape of the trigger as well as the number of …rms that enter it is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The candidate policy for optimal entry into a competitive industry, characterized by positive externalities and initial mass of …rms q 2 [0; q); is described by the following upper pro…t threshold:
Proof. See Appendix. Over the range [0; q), the optimal entry policy is to set the threshold equal to the known threshold D( q) ( q) where the pro…t ‡ow is maximum. No …rms enter if pro…ts remain below this barrier, but a discrete mass of () new …rms simultaneously enters the …rst time that is reached. To appreciate the intuition behind this result let us consider a possible sequential investment starting at q < q. As the …rms may delay entry until reaches the upper level (q) (i.e., the "optimal"entry trigger for each idle …rm in isolation), the …rst …rm (randomly selected) to invest will earn lower pro…ts D(q) (q) until some new …rms decide to invest. Hence, indicating the mass of new …rms with dq, as D(q+dq) > D(q); the trigger (q) must be larger than (q + dq). But this implies that once (q) is reached, the new trigger (q+dq) is already surpassed and all the dq …rms invest immediately. As these arguments apply for all (); in any equilibrium the …rms must invest simultaneously at (q). 19 Thus, with network externalities, no …rm would ever invest at a lower entry trigger than ( q) since this trigger is based on the most optimistic assessment with respect to other …rms, namely they all invest at ( q). On the other hand no …rm …nds it convenient to delay its entry when other …rms invest; i.e. ( q); which is also the most optimistic investment trigger of the rivals.
An immediate corollary that follows from propositions 1 and 2 is:
The pro…t threshold that triggers the "network run" of () new …rms is the same re ‡ecting barrier that triggers the marginal competitive entry under negative externalities at q:
Again, we can understand the equilibrium by writing this threshold in terms of the aggregate shock : Since D(q) (q) and D(q) is increasing in the region [0; q); the optimal policy is given by a ‡at curve starting at (0) = ( q) de…ned by:
Figure 2 summarizes the e¤ect of positive externalities on entry. Starting at q; if the initial shock is below the known trigger at q, all …rms wait until rises vertically to this level, and then simultaneously enter, creating the optimal size q: Once the optimal size is reached, to the right of q, further decisions to enter proceed as explained in the previous section. Starting at any q < q, (6) (or (7)) locates the optimal entry threshold so as to maximize the total pro…ts of the incremental number of …rms that enter (): The shock value ( q) that triggers these …rms' "network run" is the same threshold that justi…es a further marginal entry under negative externalities. 
Comments on the literature
The previous section showed that for q < q the candidate policy ( q) is the unique threshold beyond which a mass () of idle …rms …nd it optimal to move simultaneously. It has also been shown that once entry has exhausted positive externalities, new …rms will enter following the competitive rule (5), where in equilibrium the option value of waiting drops to zero. Obviously, simultaneous investment may arise under very di¤erent circumstances from those considered here. For example in Bartolini (1993) , simultaneous investment is driven by a constraint on the total size of the industry. He considers a competitive industry in which the …rms initially enter following the optimal policy as in proposition 1, until a "critical" size is reached. At this "critical" size, rent competition generates a "competitive run" that immediately …lls the rest of the quota. During this run the …rms reduce current pro…ts in an attempt to capture the rent that the industry size is expected to generate. Unlike Bartolini, a run in our model is generated by the maximization of the rent associated with positive externalities. These rents will be dissipated in the future by the competitive entry of …rms with negative externalities. In Grenadier (1996) , however, simultaneous investment occurs because two …rms rush to enter a declining real estate market that will otherwise leave space for only one …rm. In Moretto (2000) , simultaneity arises because of a bandwagon e¤ect on entry costs. Two …rms are engaged in an "attrition" game generated by the presence of incomplete information plus positive externalities on the investment costs; i.e. it is more expensive to go …rst than to adopt the technology at the same time or later when others have already done so. Although the …rst-mover disadvantage leads to sequential investment, if the asymmetry between …rms is not too high the investment occurs as a cascade. 20 At the opposite end, Huisman and Kort (1999) and Pawlina and Kort (2001) show that under complete information simultaneous investments may arise also in the presence of negative externalities. 21 Finally, Maison and Weeds (2001) show the same result in a similar duopoly model. Although they consider the simultaneous presence of negative and positive externalities, the only case in which both …rms enter simultaneously is when they know that if the investment occurred sequentially, the leader would lose out considerably once the follower decided to enter.
Conclusion
We have o¤ered a preliminary investigation into the e¤ect of competition on …rms'irreversible investment decisions under uncertainty as a generalization of the "real options"approach. We considered a product market that allows simultaneous treatment of positive externalities for a small market size and negative externalities for a large market size. The latter corresponds to a traditional competitive industries where the investment of one …rm lowers the pro…tability of others. In that case, …rms invest sequentially as market pro…tability develops. The former case corresponds to industries in which investment is mutually bene…cial, i.e. the investment of one …rm increases the pro…tability of other …rms'investments. In this case we …nd that …rms invest simultaneously after the pro…tability of the market has developed su¢ ciently. The pro…t level that triggers an initial investment under negative externalities endogenously determines the optimal start-up size of the industry.
Our theoretical results may help to explain both the rapid and sudden development that has occurred for certain network goods such as the telecommunication services (Williams et (Odlyzko, 1999) , and the many prolonged start-up problems while awaiting market development as in the case of digital fax machines (Rohlfs, 1974 (Rohlfs, , 2001 ; Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). 22 Furthermore, our results complement the recent new line of research on adoption and di¤usion of new technology. This line of research incorporates the idea that any single decision by a potential user is not between adopting or not adopting, but is a choice between adopting now or deferring the decision later. From this point of view, the adoption of a new technology is similar to any other investment decision under uncertainty about future bene…ts and irreversibility, which generates an option value of waiting (Stoneman, 2001; Luque, 2002; Hall and Khan, 2003) . Then the adopter's decision process can be modelled as suggested by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , and used here, providing another reason why di¤usion of new technology may be rather slow (Hall and Khan, 2003, p.3) .
Some extensions can easily be incorporated, such as the inclusion of …nitely-lived capital projects, stage investments, growth options, and operative options that lead to suspension or de…nitive abandonment of the investment. The model also permits study of the e¢ ciency of the investment-entry pattern. Is the equilibrium investment-entry time e¢ cient? Does the e¢ -cient entry pattern occur in equilibrium? Such a study can be conducted considering the cooperative solution where by the investment decisions are determined by maximizing the sum of the …rms' value functions or introducing a true social value function. Finally, a more substantial modi…cation concerns a comparison with the case in which there is a monopolist who possesses all investment opportunities. Although the start-up problem in that case is much simpler, the analysis of the start-up conditions and the optimal network size is particularly interesting. Speci…cally, where network externalities are present, it may be pro…table for the monopolist to sacri…ce pro…ts in the short-run in the hope of raising prices in the future after demand has grown and consumers are enjoying network e¤ects.
A Appendix
The aim of this Appendix is to prove that the candidate policies (4) and (6) are indeed optimal. The analysis is restricted to a single entry trigger strategy, i.e. as if each …rm uses a stopping rule (a pure Markovian strategy), that speci…es the critical value of the state variable beyond which the …rms invest. This assumption greatly simpli…es analysis as it rules out mixed strategy equilibria. Our choice of pure strategies can be justi…ed for at least for two reasons. First, they are very simple strategies which require …rms to have only a low level of rationality. Second, the simultaneous investment scenario with mixed strategies is outcome equivalent to …rms employing pure strategies. 23 For the proof, we have referred to certain dynamic optimization solutions extensively studied in the Operations Research literature where by an Itô process is constrained never to leave an (optimal) region (see Harrison and Taksar, 1983, Karatzas and Shreve 1984; Harrison, 1985) , to some wellknown applications to a competitive economy (see Leahy, 1993; Bartolini, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and to scale economies (Dixit, 1995) .
Let us consider the value of a …rm V (q; ); that is active in the market, as the expected discounted stream of pro…ts:
where J [t= ] is the indicator function and the expectation is taken considering that the number of active …rms may change over time by new entry. The solution to (8) can be obtained starting within a time interval within which no new entry occurs. Over this interval the number of …rms is …xed and the …rm is an asset which pays a ‡ow of pro…ts D(q) per unit of time, and experiences a "capital"gain E[dV (q; )] as evolves stochastically. Assuming V (q; ) to be a twice-di¤erentiable function with respect to and using Itô's Lemma to expand dV (q; ); the solution of (8) is given by the following di¤erential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 , p. 179-180):
Provided that > , a family solution of (9) can be written as: V (q; ) = A(q) + B(q) + D(q) , where 1 < < = ; < 0 are, respectively, the positive and the negative roots of the characteristic equation (x) = 1 2 2 x(x 1) + x = 0; and A; B are two constants to be determined. To keep V (q; ) …nite as becomes small, i.e. lim !0 V (q; ) = 0; we discard the term in the negative power of ; setting B = 0. Moreover, the boundary conditions also require that lim !1 n V (q; )
where the second term in the limit represents the discounted present value of the pro…t ‡ow over an in…nite horizon starting from (Harrison 1985, p. 44) . Then, the general solution reduces to:
Since the last term represents the value of the active …rm in the absence of new entry, then A(q) is the correction of the …rm's value due to the new entry and A(q) must be negative. To determine this coe¢ cient we need to impose some suitable boundary conditions. First of all, perfect competition (free entry) requires the idle …rms to expect zero pro…ts at entry. Indicating by (q) the value of the shock, ; at which the q-th …rm is indi¤erent between entry right away or waiting another instant, the matching value condition requires:
The …rm's competitive behavior keeps the value of active …rms below the level K; by increasing the number of …rms in the market. As we assumed that the …rm's size is in…nitesimal, then the trigger level, (q); is a continuous function in q: Secondly, as the term in (11) is always positive, any change in q either raises or lowers the whole function V (q; ); depending on whether the coe¢ cient A(q) increases or decreases. By totally di¤erentiating (11) with respect to q we get:
where, as long as each …rm rationally forecasts the future development of the whole market and new entries by competitors, at the optimal entry threshold we get V q (q; (q)) = 0 (Bartolini, 1993; proposition 1; Grenadier, 2002, p. 699). Then:
This smooth pasting condition states that either each …rm exercises its entry option at the level of at which its value is tangent to the entry cost, i.e. V (q; (q)) = 0, or the optimal trigger, (q); does not change with q: While the former means that the value function is smooth at entry and the trigger is a continuous function of q; the latter indicates that a single …rm would bene…t from marginally anticipating or delaying its entry decision. In particular, if V (q; (q)) < 0; it means that the value of a …rm is expected to increase if drops. On the contrary, if V (q; (q)) > 0; it means that a …rm would expect to make losses versus a future drop in . In both situations (12) is satis…ed by imposing
The rest of the proof is devoted to showing that for; the smooth pasting condition reduces to a traditional one, such that V (q; (q)) = 0 and (q) is increasing in q: For q < q; we get V (q; (q)) > 0 which requires
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
To prove proposition 1 we need to show two results: (1) in the case of, the smooth pasting condition (12) reduces to V (q; (q)) = 0; (2) the optimal competitive trigger, (q); is equivalent to the trigger of a …rm in isolation, that is of a …rm claiming to be the last to enter. For (1), let us consider the value of an active …rm starting at the point (q; < ); a …rm that would follow the optimal policy hereafter. Indicating by T the …rst time that reaches the trigger ; the optimal policy must then satisfy:
where the second equality follows from the fact that, by (11) , V (q; (q)) = K: Moreover, by using some standard results in the theory of regulated stochastic processes (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 315-316) :
, we can rewrite (13) as:
To choose ; the …rst order condition is:
which gives:
Since D(q) is decreasing in the interval [ q; Q]; (q) is increasing. Substituting (16) into (14) we can solve for A(q); which is negative as required by (10):
Finally, substituting (17) into (14) and rearranging we obtain (10):
from which it is easy to verify that V q (q; ) 6 = 0 within the interval < (q) and is zero at the boundary. For (2), let us consider an idle …rm pretending to be the last to enter the industry. With q …rms already active, if the …rm decides to enter when the shock is^ ; it pays K and receives in return an asset that values D(q)^ . Now write F (q; ) for the value of the …rm's option to enter at time zero. This takes the form:
where T indicates the …rst time that hits the trigger^ : Rearranging, we get:
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to^ and solving, we can show that the optimal threshold^ is equivalent to (16) . By direct inspection of (14) and (20) we immediately to note that the value of an active …rm (14) is the di¤erence between the value of an active myopic …rm and the value of an inactive myopic …rm as expressed by (20) . Competition, therefore, not only does not alter the incentive to trade an idle …rm for an active …rm, but also encourages both to have the same price at entry. Using (16) in equation (18) gives V (q; (q)) K = 0, i.e. in equilibrium …rms expect zero pro…t at entry (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch.8) .
Since, by (3), the myopic pro…t process and the competitive pro…t process are identical until , the pro…t ‡ow that the …rm is able to obtain following the policy^ is the best that it can do, at least until T: However, by the principle of optimality this choice is also optimal for the rest of the period as (13) shows; if the optimal policy of the single …rm calls for it to be active at tomorrow; it is obvious that the optimal policy today is to enter at . Finally, as (13) is a continuous function in ; the limit as !^ shows that^ is a Nash equilibrium (Leahy, 1993 ; proposition 1).
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
In the case of q < q we have to show three things: (1) that a single …rm can no longer claim to be the last to enter the industry and therefore, the optimal competitive trigger is no longer equivalent to the trigger of a …rm in isolation; (2) that the candidate policy described in proposition 2 satis…es the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of optimality; (3) that it is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For (1) and (2), let us consider an (idle) …rm that follows the optimal policy (q). As (q) is decreasing in the interval q < q, the higher the number of …rms in the industry, the greater the pro…t ‡ow at entry. The (idle) …rm would then maximize its entry option by claiming to be always the last to enter the market, expecting an inadmissible upward jump in pro…ts. At = (q), the …rm's value is simply V (q; (q)) D(q) (q) . Then, we can see that:
In (21), the inequality holds since it represents the correction due to the new entry (i.e. A(q) in (10)). This contradicts the smooth pasting condition V (q; (q)) = 0; and then the optimality of (q): As all (idle) …rms are equal, all expect an upward jump in pro…ts at = (q) if no other …rm enters afterwards. This may induce each to delay entry waiting for the others to enter …rst. However, as (q) is decreasing in the interval q < q, the upward jump in pro…ts would decrease as more …rms have already entered and it disappears at q = q; where the …rm's value function at entry is simply the known function (18) . This con…rms that: a) the candidate policy for the interval q < q is to impose d (q) dq = 0; b) the optimal level of shock that triggers entry is ( q); where the pro…t ‡ow is maximum for all the discrete sizes of investment (); c) at q the necessary condition for optimality, V ( q; ( q)) = 0; turns out to be satis…ed again.
To verify whether the necessary conditions are satis…ed, we calculate the value of an active …rm starting at the point (q; ); and that follows a policy so de…ned: wait until T; at which the process rises to a level c > ; which corresponds to an immediate increase of the industry size to b > q: Using (13) the expected payo¤ V (q; ) from this policy is equal to:
The best moment for the industry size to jump as well as the dimension of the jump, are given by the following …rst order conditions: When b and c are chosen according to the candidate policy so that b = q and c = ( q); the value function reduces to (10) and the matching value condition requires V (b; c) = K: These prove that the candidate policy satis…es the …rst order conditions. By processing (21) we can say more about the necessary conditions. Let the …rm, as in (22) , wait until the …rst time the process rises to the myopic trigger level c (b); corresponding to an immediate increase of the industry size to b > q: Assume also that the …rm expects no more entry after b: Therefore its expected payo¤ V (b; ) from this time onwards equals the discounted stream of pro…ts …xed at D(b); i.e.:
Comparing (23) with (10) gives A(b) = 0: Therefore, to obtain the constant A(q); subject to the claim that beyond b no other …rm will enter the market, we substitute (10) into the condition V q (q; (q)) = 0 to get A 0 (q) (q) + D 0 (q) (q) = 0; resulting in:
Integrating (24) between q and b gives:
Taking account of the fact that A(b) = 0; this integral gives the constant A(q) as:
Substituting (25) into (10), which we rewrite to make explicit its dependence on the end size b, yields:
As long as D(b) > D(q); the …rst term in (26) is positive and it forecasts the advantage the …rm would experience by the entry of b q …rms when hits (b): That is, if the …rm were able to choose the optimal dimension of the jump, it would be b ! q which happens the …rst time that reaches ( q). Thus, as opposed to before when non-sequential investments are possible, the necessary conditions would coordinate an optimal simultaneous entry by all …rms. Finally, if D 00 (q) < 0 the above necessary conditions are also su¢ cient.
Since each …rm foresees the bene…t from the entry of others and observes the state variable ; it instantaneously considers when to enter by maximizing (26) . Then, with simultaneous investment the …rms'optimal strategies are easy to …nd; each …rm invests as if it were the only to invest but, with the expectation of earning all network bene…ts; i.e. ( q) is a (symmetric) Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium for all q < q. In addition, as the reaction lags are literally non-existent, no …rm is incentivated to deviate from the entry strategy ! ( q) and b ! q; given that the other …rms do not deviate. Finally, since is a Markov process in levels (Harrison, 1985, p. 5-6) , the conditional expectation (22) depends only from the starting states : Therefore, at each date t > 0; the …rm's values resemble those described in (26) , which makes the equilibrium subgame perfect. 
